We examine government cartelization efforts in crude oil production. Texas and Saudi Arabia are alleged to act as swing producers to maintain the interstate and OPEC (1973 on) oil cartels respectively. We analyze the political constraints that affected the ability of Texas and Saudi Arabia to act as residual producers within their respective cartels. In the case of Texas, political factors molded individual firm production quotas, advantaging high-cost producers and hence, reducing total cartel net profits. Further, Texas had limited range for adjusting total state production to maintain interstate output at levels consistent with target prices. Saudi Arabia's role as swing producer within OPEC raises similar questions regarding how cartel output is shared among members, and the extent to which domestic economic and political pressures coming from various member countries may undermine the effectiveness of the cartel. OPEC 's coordination problem has been more difficult than that faced by the interstate cartel for a variety of reasons that we explore. Even so, they have not kept the OPEC members in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular, from exerting a strong influence on the level of world oil prices. JEL Classification K2, L1, N4, Q4
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I. Introduction.
Cartels have long attracted attention because of their potential ability through producer coordination to reduce output and raise prices above competitive levels. If successful, cooperating parties can achieve monopoly profits. Cartelization, however, suffers from well-known problems. Agreeing on cartel output, prices, and individual firm quotas can be contentious, especially if firms are heterogeneous with respect to size, production cost, product characteristics, and assessments of the market. Honest disagreements among the parties may delay or block the formation of a cartel. Strategic behavior, whereby some parties hold out in order to achieve larger quotas or shares of cartel profits, also is a hazard. Additionally, once cartels are established, quota compliance among members and entry by new parties can threaten effective collusion. Cheating leads to greater production, lower prices, reduced collective profits, and potentially, the unraveling of the cartel. Even if the parties understand the effect cheating may have on the future of the agreement, they may still exceed their quotas if they have low production costs relative to the other parties, are very small, or have high discount rates.
1 Successful cartels attract new entrants, eager to earn cartel profits. New entry, however, requires recalculation of individual quotas if total production levels are to be maintained. Technological change that 1 If individual quotas differentially constrain low-cost firms to produce well below their profit maximizing level, they have greater incentive to cheat. For discussion, see Alexander and Libecap (2000) . More generally, Alexander (1997) argues that firms with low production costs are more likely to defect because they can do better in a non-cooperative, non-collusive equilibrium, than under an agreement that higher-cost firms were attempting to impose. Further, Wiggins and Libecap (1987) argue that very small firms bear little or none of the industry-wide pecuniary losses as prices fall with the unraveling of the cartel and hence, have less incentive to maintain the agreement. Finally, a standard cartel problem is that firms with very high discount rates may value the short run profits of defecting and so discount the loss of future cartel profits that they take less care to maintain it.
2 differentially shifts production costs or changes product characteristics so that the industry is less homogeneous than before are additional obstacles.
For these reasons, colluding parties often turn to government to promote cartelization through price, production, and entry regulation. Governments also may be involved directly in collusion if production occurs across political jurisdictions, such that coordinated output within one jurisdiction is insufficient to effectively limit output to fix market prices. Through the coercive power of the state, negotiations can be speeded, holdouts blocked, prices fixed, entry barred, and quotas more effectively enforced. Even so, government assistance may not bring complete cartelization that maximizes collusive profits. Political constraints limit the prices that can be charged and mold individual quotas in ways that are inconsistent with group profit maximization. These political constraints and their effects on cartel structure and performance are the focus of this chapter.
We examine dominant firm arguments in crude oil production. 2 When one producer is much larger than the other parties, it can act to promote and maintain the cartel by taking unilateral production adjustments to sustain target cartel output and prices. According to the theory, the dominant firm sets its output after subtracting the production of fringe producers from estimated demand at the target price. If fringe producers expand their output, the dominant firm, as residual producer, reduces production, and if fringe producers reduce output, the dominant firm increases its production. The residual or swing producer, then, acts as the balance to protect the cartel.
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Texas and Saudi Arabia are alleged to act as swing producers to maintain the interstate and OPEC (1973 on) oil cartels respectively. 4 We analyze the political constraints that affected the ability of Texas and Saudi Arabia to act as residual producers within their respective cartels. In the case of Texas, we argue that political factors molded individual firm production quotas, advantaging high-cost producers and hence, reducing total cartel net profits. Further, Texas had limited range for adjusting total state production to maintain interstate output at levels consistent with target prices. Any large adjustment in state output required similar adjustments in individual firm production allowables with important political consequences. A large, temporary increase in Texas production to counter a shortfall elsewhere would be difficult to reduce subsequently.
More problematical would be reductions in state output and firm (well) allowables to offset increases in other jurisdictions. Production cuts would impact not only royalty and lease owners (land owners and producing firms), but also oil field workers and equipment suppliers. These effects would not be favorably received among voters if the production adjustment were perceived as a response to overproduction elsewhere. Hence, the state 4 regulatory body, the Texas Railroad Commission, would be reluctant to order sharp, sustained production cuts to balance cheating in other areas. There were limits to how far a state regulatory body could go to protect interstate oil coordination.
Saudi Arabia's role as swing producer within OPEC raises similar questions regarding how the "work" of the cartel in restraining output is shared among members, and the extent to which domestic economic and political pressures coming from various member countries may undermine the effectiveness of the cartel. These questions are surely as important to the Saudis as ever they were in Texas. Despite continuing (and expensive) attempts at diversification, crude oil and refined products accounted in 1999 for some 90 percent of total Saudi exports, down from 99 percent in the early 1980s. As shown in Table 1 , this degree of dependence is high even by OPEC standards (the rest of OPEC derived only 59 percent of export revenues from crude oil and refined products in 1999). Thus, the success with which the Saudis are able to manage their relationship with the rest of OPEC ranks, alongside regional security issues, as the principal domestic challenge facing Saudi leaders.
Although OPEC has been compared on many occasions to the Texas Railroad Commission, Adelman (2001) , Claes (2001) and Moran (1982) each argue that OPEC's task is the more difficult, with a lower chance of success. In the first place, the producers of OPEC oil are sovereign nations, not private firms, with no legal system in place to police or enforce their agreements. The production restraints that OPEC managers adopt are entirely voluntary in nature, without any counterpart to the Connally Hot Oil Act to 5 penalize cheaters and bring discipline to the group. Moreover, the OPEC producers maintain, in their individual roles as autonomous nation states, a wide range of political, social, and other non-economic interests that may at any time come to temporarily dominate or dissolve their common, but narrower, interest in the oil market. The idea that all OPEC members are constantly working toward the collective good overlooks the multidimensional nature of their relationship, which we explore later in this paper. Finally, the OPEC members are at a severe informational disadvantage, compared to the Texas Railroad Commission, with regard to the state of the oil market and the likely impacts of their actions to influence it. The type of information regarding current inventory levels and polling procedures to forecast monthly fluctuations in demand that allowed the Railroad Commission to anticipate market trends simply do not exist on the scale that is needed to manage world oil prices. Limitations in OPEC's ability to forecast market reactions to its initiatives might not matter so much, as noted by Adelman (2001) and Moran (1982) , if the feedback loop of information on resulting inventory changes were not so weak and obscure.
While these tactical difficulties may have prevented OPEC from attaining the same degree of consistent success achieved by the Texas Railroad Commission, they have not kept the OPEC members in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular, from exerting a strong influence on the level of world oil prices. the individuals involved could be fined $2,000 and/or jailed for six months. 11 Importantly, however, the legislation maintained individual state regulation of oil production.
II. Texas and the
9 Libecap (1989, 839 Under the compact the governors of member states and representatives of their regulatory agencies met quarterly to discuss prices, oil production plans, and other regulatory issues.
But the compact had no explicit regulatory authority. With the signing of the Interstate Oil
Compact in 1935, the essential elements for the interstate oil cartel were in place, and they remained through 1972.
Under the Interstate Oil Compact each state agency set monthly production levels and allocated the state total among regulated wells. The Monthly Petroleum Statement of the Bureau of Mines provided the Texas Railroad Commission and the other state agencies with market-demand estimates. These estimates included both total demand for domestic 12 production and demand for each state's output within that total. With this information, the Railroad Commission set the total monthly allowable production within the state and allocated it across regulated wells. In determining monthly output levels, the regulatory agencies of the compact states met approximately at the same time and shared information on production plans.
A major concern of the state regulatory agencies was maintaining the viability of high-cost wells. Their owners were numerous, and they formed powerful political constituencies in all of the states. This objective required output controls on low-cost producers so that total domestic crude oil production could be reduced to equal estimated demand at a targeted price able to sustain high-cost producers. While the commissioners received only modest state salaries and there is no evidence that they received payments from the oil industry, the prestige and influence of their office was enormous. By restraining low-cost oil production, the commissioners protected the interests of the thousands of small independent oil producers who were found throughout Texas.
These actions paid off politically, since the Railroad Commissioners were routinely reelected in statewide voting. One commissioner, Ernest Thompson, served for 33 years (1932 to 1965) , and in all periods the agency was characterized by stable membership. the next 40 years, the Railroad Commission focused its production constraints on the state's low-cost wells. Once the monthly state production quota was set by the agency, it was prorated among all regulated wells. Since high-cost wells were exempt from regulation, their output had to be subtracted from the state total before individual well allocations could be made. After production from exempt wells was subtracted from the total state quota, the remaining proratable production was divided by the capacity output of the regulated wells in Texas to give a "market demand factor" (proratable production divided by capacity production). As such, the market-demand factor was the fraction of capacity production that would be allowed from all regulated wells in the upcoming month.
Until late 1962 the market-demand factor was converted to a number of authorized producing days for the next month. After 1962 it was expressed as the authorized percentage of capacity production. To arrive at each well's monthly quota, the state market demand factor was multiplied by the top allowable or capacity production for the individual well.
In addition to the exemptions granted stripper wells, the Railroad Commission also gave preferential treatment in production quotas to small oil producing firms, even though this practice raised production costs. It encouraged the drilling of extra wells. Monthly quotas for regulated wells were based upon acreage and depth, but the commission placed more weight on depth than on acreage. The more deep wells a firm drilled, the greater its quota. Although all firms could take advantage of this arrangement, because the rules discounted acreage, they disadvantaged firms with more and larger leases. To further 14 promote drilling, the commission routinely granted exemptions to small firms to the 10-acre spacing rule to allow for denser drilling.
The internal political constraints on the Railroad Commission help to explain why the agency could not systematically regulate Texas production each month to be the residual producer within the Interstate Oil Compact. If output significantly expanded in the other states and Texas routinely cut back to maintain prices, at some point the restrictions upon low-cost Texas producers would be so great that they would resist and challenge the agency's political mandate. Further, given political pressures, the commission had limited degrees of freedom to fine-tune Texas output in response to production in the other states.
Hence, the commission had incentive to seek coordinated output policies among the states to avoid having Texas bear the full costs of controlling crude oil output. The other members of the Interstate Oil Compact also had incentives to cooperate with Texas, since the Railroad Commission restrained the large reserves of low-cost Texas production. The clear beneficiaries were high-cost wells in the prorationing states.
Texas does not appear to have acted as a residual or swing producer within the Interstate Compact. Libecap (1989) 
III. Saudi Arabia within OPEC.
Although OPEC gained broad public notice only with the first oil price shock of 1973, the organization was formed thirteen years earlier by the governments of several oilproducing states who had grown dissatisfied with the dwindling stream of revenues derived from their crude oil production. Tax provisions put in place during the 1950s were designed to capture 50 percent of all profits from the production and sale of their resources.
However, growing competition in the world oil industry since 1947 threatened to steadily erode the price of oil, and with it the potential size of government tax receipts. 16 Amuzegar (1999) summarizes the manner by which deteriorating relations between the producing companies and host governments finally gave birth to OPEC in September 1960. Saudi
Arabia and Venezuela are generally regarded as the founding fathers, and the organization 15 Oil and Gas Journal, December 17, 1962. 16 Griffin and Teece (1982: 8) .
20 numbered 13 members at its peak. The departures of two relatively small exporters in the 1990s brought membership down to the current level of 11.
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The single thread that binds all OPEC members together is their status as oil exporting countries. Some are major producers located in the Persian Gulf, others are relatively minor producers located abroad. Some member countries are predominantly Arabic, others are not. 18 Some have low population densities with relatively high per capita income levels and modernized infrastructure, others are overcrowded and poor. In summary, the members are a heterogeneous lot who face distinct social, economic, and political challenges in their home countries.
19 Table 1 summarizes some of the country differences that are most relevant to our analysis.
The history of OPEC can be divided into three main periods that are distinguished by changes in the organization's goals and modus operandi. During the first phase, 1960-1969, the organization mostly restricted its efforts to winning a larger share of the oil profits that private companies generated within their territory, the stated goal being to hike government take from 50 to 80 percent. This was to be achieved through steady increase in 22 Although the production cuts were soon rescinded, and the embargo never had much effect, these announcements panicked the market and fueled a speculative demand for crude oil inventories, which ultimately lifted spot oil prices to unprecedented heights. 20 See Adelman (1972: 207-208) , Griffin and Teece (1982: 7) , and Amuzegar (1999: 29) for further discussion. 21 Adelman (1972: 250-256) and Claes (2001: 63) . 22 Claes (2001: 64) .
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Even if the various OPEC members had not envisioned such a dramatic rise in the price level, they were quick to observe how much consumers were willing to pay, at least in the short run, to avoid being cut off. This epiphany translated into increases that pushed the "official" OPEC price Each panic brought fresh and dramatic demonstrations of consumers' willingness to pay, which induced OPEC to push the official price of Saudi crude oil up to $34 by October, 1981. 23 During this second phase of OPEC's history, no production allocation or export quota was imposed on any member. Each country was free to export as much oil as it could, as long as sales were made at the official price.
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The third phase in OPEC's history, lasting from 1982 to date, was triggered by growing surplus in the marketplace (the product of reduced consumption coupled with rising non-OPEC oil supplies, both spurred by the price shocks of the 1970s), which was registered in sharply falling spot market crude oil price levels. OPEC's system of freely exporting at official prices was abandoned and replaced by a formal system of export quotas designed to take oil out of the market and support the price level. This is the phase of OPEC's history that most resembles the classic textbook example of a cartel, at least outwardly.
Much debate surrounds the question of when, if ever, OPEC has actually behaved as the classic textbook cartel. There is no question that total output has been restricted, and this is not due to any underlying scarcity of the resource. Total OPEC production fell from One school of thought, represented by Moran (1978) and Teece (1982) , takes the view that the limited domestic revenue needs of some OPEC members, particularly those with low "absorptive capacity," imposed an indirect restriction on the volume of their 25 Production data are from U.S. Energy Information Administration (2001). Proved reserve data are from various year-end issues of the Oil and Gas Journal.
individual exports. The higher the price, the lower the volume of oil exports required to achieve a revenue target sufficient to carry out the planned level of national spending. Accumulation of foreign assets (real or financial) was deemed to be risky and undesirable, so better to leave the oil in the ground than to produce at levels that would generate a financial surplus. The result is a backward-bending supply curve that links lower oil output to higher prices in a manner that requires no coordination among the OPEC members.
One problem with this line of argument is that the "absorptive capacities" of OPEC nations seemed, after the first few years of bounty, to increase faster than export revenues.
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According to Teece (1982: 84) , the combined government expenditure of all OPEC members grew by nearly 34 percent per year during 1972-79. The OPEC nations, taken as a group, were in deficit on current account by 1982. Even Saudi Arabia was running in arrears by 1983 (see Table 1 ). 27 Whatever merits the backward-bending supply theory may have held earlier, it hardly seems applicable anymore.
Even before the appearance of current account deficits, however, there were grounds for doubting the target revenue theory. For example, the theory would not have predicted that OPEC members with the greatest absorptive capacities would have significantly restricted their oil exports, yet at the peak of the 1981 price explosion, the 26 Adelman (1982: 44-45) , for example, points out that the Saudis' state budget grew by a factor of twenty-two over a period of eight years, rising from $4 billion in 1973 to $88 billion by 1981. 27 Amuzegar (1999: 48-115) evaluates in detail the manner in which each OPEC member handled the windfall gains that were earned as oil prices escalated.
25 extent of shut-in capacity (measured as the unused percentage of a country's sustainable production) was nearly identical at 10 percent for both the low absorption (Group I) and high absorption (Group III) members of OPEC.
28 Griffin (1985) finds considerably more empirical support for the cartel model than for the hypothesis of backward-bending supply. To say that the OPEC members desired or attempted a collusive restriction of supply does not, of course, carry any implication regarding the success of that enterprise. To succeed OPEC must, like any cartel, settle on a common view of appropriate market price and output; and then fashion an acceptable division of the spoils. Both undertakings have been fraught with difficulties that stem from OPEC's heterogeneous composition, diverse political and social goals, and basic notions of equity.
Where production costs differ significantly among cartel members, the first-best principles of wealth maximization require that production be concentrated in the hands of low-cost suppliers. In OPEC's case, this would mean that only Persian Gulf countries would be permitted to produce. 29 That outcome is not acceptable to the peoples of Nigeria, Venezuela, or Indonesia who aspire to economic development. Output restrictions within OPEC therefore have to be shared on an "equitable" basis; and each member brings its own sense of equity to the table. The resulting compromise produces a paradox that would 28 These numbers reflect our calculations based on Teece's (1982:72) data. 29 Estimates by Adelman (1993) show development costs in Indonesia, for example, to be fifteen times higher than in Saudi Arabia for the 1989-90 period; while Nigeria and Algeria are put at multiples of 7.0 and 9.5 times the level of Saudi costs, respectively. 26 never arise in monopoly or competition: higher cost units are produced before lower cost units, reducing in absolute terms the size of the producers' surplus. It would be an interesting calculation, one that we have not performed, to figure the burden that avoidable production costs have imposed on OPEC members during the past thirty years.
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Coordination among OPEC members has been shaped, but also jeopardized, by political rivalries among members and the vagaries of domestic policy agendas within the individual states. Moran (1982) and Amuzegar (1999: 44-46) We believe there is room for (and evidence of) serious disagreement among OPEC members even regarding the most central aspect of their common enterprise: the appropriate target level for world oil prices. By luck of the draw, those members who hold the most extensive reserves also enjoy the lowest production costs. It would be remarkable, indeed, if the Saudis' preferences regarding current and future pricing of crude oil were to match those of their poorer counterparts who must spend much more to produce each barrel and will run out sooner. The basic calculus of inter temporal wealth maximization shows why: To illustrate, we contrast the position of Indonesia with that of the Saudis. Our numbers, although realistic, are intended only to be indicative of the relative positions of the two countries, not an authoritative statement of facts. The Indonesians, whose current reserves are sufficient to last only 10 more years, should be content to shut-in a barrel of current production only if the profit foregone today was expected to grow at the rate of interest during the interim. 32 If we take today's price to be $26.50 (the midpoint of the current OPEC "price band" mechanism), and the marginal cost of a barrel of Indonesian oil to be $10, then the profit foregone today would amount to $16.50 (here we are assuming that because Indonesia is a relatively small producer, its decision to produce or withhold a barrel of oil has only a negligible impact on market price; thus marginal revenue equals price). Holding that barrel in the ground for ten years (while remaining reserves continue to be depleted) makes sense only if the price appreciates significantly in the meantime. Assuming a discount rate of 10 percent, the price would have to reach $52.80 ten years hence for Indonesia's sacrifice to be adequately repaid. That is, the NPV of 52.80 minus 10.00 equals 16.50, given ten years wait at 10 percent per annum.
Given the variety of views regarding future oil prices expressed recently in the media, the prospect of $50 oil by the year 2011 may not seem unreasonable, and current Indonesian reserves will last only that long anyway, so it is not necessary to look farther into the future. On this logic, an OPEC strategy of greater withholding of current production may not seem ill advised to the Indonesians.
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From the Saudi perspective, however, several elements of this calculation must be revised. The first takes account of the much lower cost of Saudi production, which we take as $2.25 per barrel, although it might be lower. The second takes account of the Saudi's larger market share, which means their decision to produce or withhold a barrel of oil does have a perceptible impact on the market price. We will assume, perhaps not unrealistically, that the elasticity of demand for Saudi oil is -2. It may be greater but is probably not lessneither possibility would affect the point of our illustration. Based on an elasticity of -2, in conjunction with a current market price of $26.50, the Saudi's marginal revenue from a barrel sold today would then be ½*$26.50, or $13.25, which gives, after deducting the marginal cost of production, a net present value of current production of $11.00.
Holding that barrel in the ground for ten years makes sense only if prices are expected to appreciate significantly. Assuming a 10 percent discount rate, as before, and holding the elasticity of demand constant, the price would have to be expected to reach $61.56 by year 2011 for additional withholding to be attractive to the Saudis.
Evidently, the burden of withholding is much higher on the Saudis than on the Indonesians and is justified only by much higher future price expectations. The illustration is hypothetical, but the point is not: differences in costs and demand elasticities among the cartel members create systematic differences in the perceived wisdom of shutting in production. The fact that the Saudis also have larger reserves than Indonesia, sufficient to sustain current production for 80 years, only compounds the problem. Withholding a barrel of Saudi production for 40 years could only be justified (again assuming a 10 percent discount rate and no change in demand elasticity) if prices are expected to reach $1,000 per barrel by the year 2041. It does not seem a likely prospect. Lower prices would help the Saudis (not the Indonesians) exploit their massive reserves before development of lower cost or more desirable alternatives (natural gas, hydrogen fuel cells, etc.) has pushed oil aside.
Thus, heterogeneity in reserves, costs, politics, social pressures, and public policy all have the potential to breed disagreement and dissension within OPEC. With a strong 30 dose of the free-rider problem thrown in for good measure, and lack of any enforcement mechanism, it is fair to ask whether OPEC has maintained enough unity of purpose and cooperative effort to achieve much of anything. An alternative view is that a special subset of the OPEC members, the so-called "cartel core," has acted as the residual supplier, compensating for the undisciplined and volatile production flows coming from opportunistic members of the "cartel fringe" by regulating their own output accordingly.
This is a common assumption in economic models of OPEC behavior, although the selection of countries who belong in the "core" is sometimes larger and sometimes smaller-in the extreme shrinking to include only Saudi Arabia, as discussed by Moran (1978: 2) .
The distinction between core and fringe is that members of the fringe tend to abide by cartel restraints only when it is in their individual interest to do so; i.e. the fringe are members of the cartel in name only. During the 1970-81 phase of OPEC's history, before the regime of individual export quotas came into use, opportunistic behavior by the fringe would take the form of unauthorized price discounts offered to expand the market for one country's output-at the expense of all others. Although the terms of all sales were confidential, and the complicated matrix of quality differentials tended to obscure cheating, there is no shortage of evidence that individual OPEC members repeatedly undersold the "official" OPEC price in this fashion. 34 At certain times, the difficulty of holding all OPEC producers to a single price became simply insurmountable, and then price differences were 34 See Adelman (1982: 47) and Claes (2001: 181) for examples. Although widespread cheating is not unexpected, it can lead to the rapid demise of the cartel. In OPEC's case this has not happened, and the market price continues to be elevated considerably above anyone's best estimate of what would be the competitive price of crude oil. We recognize two factors that may be responsible for this apparent anomaly.
First, the serendipitous timing of oil market disruptions that we attribute to the intrusion of politics and domestic affairs has largely worked in OPEC's favor. The initial oil price shock of 1973 (which was precipitated by the Arab-Israeli War) is one example. It has been succeeded, by the Iranian Revolution in 1979 (which removed about 2 mbd of production capacity from the market and came just as secret price discounting was becoming more prevalent), the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 (which removed an 35 Moran (1982: 107) . 36 Claes (2001: 259-263 The second factor worth noting is the Saudis' special role as "dominant firm." Even if there were no cartel, the dominant reserve position and relatively low costs of Saudi Arabia would dictate its role as a "swing" producer. As in the textbook model of a dominant firm's behavior, it would be in Saudi Arabia's interest to regulate its own output based on the residual demand for its product. According to this view, the primary determinants of Saudi production would be the strength of overall market demand and the propensity of "fringe" producers to satisfy it. If the supply behavior of the fringe is erratic-expanding and contracting in response to myriad other factors-then we would expect the output of the dominant firm to fluctuate as well, but in the opposite direction. If monthly output adjustments by the dominant firm were charted against those of the fringe producers, a pattern of countervailing changes should be visible, and quite distinct from the relationship one expects from a disciplined cartel in which member outputs tend to expand 33 and contract more or less in concert, according to fluctuations in the overall level of shared demand.
We have plotted this series of monthly output adjustments, for Saudi Arabia versus the rest of OPEC, over the entire interval 1973-2000. The results (see Figure 2 ) provide rather strong support for the dominant firm model and cast doubt on the hypothesis of cooperative cartel behavior. Over the entire period, we find that the contemporaneous monthly production changes by the Saudis and the rest of OPEC went in opposite directions 35.5 percent of the time (119 countervailing changes out of a total 335 months). The frequency of countervailing adjustments seems high, certainly more than would be expected of a disciplined cartel. 37 We should emphasize that even a dominant firm will, ceteris paribus, adjust output in the same direction as the fringe whenever there are shifts in aggregate demand, and in some months there may be no change in output at all. Therefore, the dominant firm model hardly implies that countervailing adjustments should occur in every month. Depending on the volatility of cartel demand relative to the volatility of supply from the fringe, the dominant firm would be expected to make countervailing adjustments in output anywhere between 0 and 100 percent of the time. No such movements would be expected within a disciplined cartel.
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37 When the same test is applied to annual output levels, the results are even stronger, with countervailing adjustments taken by the Saudis in 15 of the 27 years (56%) of the sample period. 38 Even Griffin's (1985) model of a loosely bound OPEC cartel, which recognizes that members' cutbacks need not be proportional, does not anticipate countervailing movements in production.
Our interpretation of the evidence therefore tends to fall on the side of a market structure in which the Saudis exhibit dominant firm behavior. The same pattern emerges when we examine just the subinterval during which OPEC assigned formal quotas to each member (April 1982 through December 2000 . During that subinterval, the Saudis made countervailing output adjustments 36 percent of the time (see Table 2 ). Thus, although OPEC's working mode changed from unstructured support of an official price target to mandated compliance with official export quotas (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) , the Saudi tendency to compensate for the excesses of its OPEC peers does not appear to have changed much at all. The only time the Saudis tended to refrain from making countervailing adjustments for a span of more than twelve months was during 1979-80, when the production facilities of Iran first, then Iraq, were unexpectedly taken out of service due to force majeure.
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When comparing this evidence to the Texas Railroad Commission experience discussed earlier, we find much stronger indications that Saudi Arabia has played the role of dominant firm and swing producer within a relatively undisciplined cartel, whereas the pattern of production regulation achieved by the Railroad Commission and its IOCC counterparts bears a stronger resemblance to the cooperative behavior of a cohesive cartel.
IV. Concluding Remarks.
This chapter has examined the ability of the Texas Railroad Commission and Saudi Arabia to act as residual producers to maintain oil prices within their respective oil production cartels. In the case of the interstate production coordination that existed for 40 years from 1933 through 1972, the evidence is that Texas played a central role. This is understandable since the state had the largest share of low-cost oil reserves in the country.
At the same time, however, the state regulatory agency, the Texas Railroad Commission, could not systematically and unilaterally adjust Texas production to offset production increases in other states. It could differentially constrain production from time to time to protect the cartel from crises, but it could not do so routinely without being subjected to a political backlash within the state. It could, and did, regulate low-cost production to protect high-cost producers throughout the U.S., but this action was politically popular in Texas because of the political influence of the thousands of high-cost small producers in the state.
While Texas does not appear to have acted as a residual or swing producer within the cartel, the state was a leader in more loosely coordinating output to maintain comparatively stable nominal prices.
Indications that Saudi Arabia has played the role of swing producer within OPEC are much stronger. Despite continuous attempts, at least since the quota system was formally adopted in 1982, to achieve cooperative reductions and expansions of OPEC supply to match fluctuations in market demand, Saudi Arabia's own production adjustments have tended to be in a countervailing direction: cutting back as the rest of the 36 cartel expands and vice versa. In fact, the Saudi role as swing producer was established in OPEC's earlier phase, before individual export quotas were imposed on the group.
Both OPEC and the Interstate Oil Compact Commission are government-sponsored, rather than private, cartels. However, sharp contrast in their political structures has led to significant differences in cartel behavior and success. In the case of Texas and the IOCC, individual states exercised sovereign regulation of production by private firms within their own jurisdictions, but were aided by the superior authority of the federal government to monitor and penalize cheating. That larger governmental framework also provided the individual states with an integrated and efficient information feedback system by which regional demand and inventory levels could be monitored. Moreover, the dominant political position of small, high-cost producers within each of the major producing states tended to create uniform support for common regulatory actions. Thus, Texas did not fully exploit its status as the dominant, low-cost producer because that would have harmed an important in-state constituency as well as other members of the IOCC.
OPEC, in contrast, might better be viewed as a private cartel. There is no central government authority to monitor and enforce cartel agreements. Compliance with output restrictions is voluntary and unenforceable, just like the collusive agreements among firms that act in defiance of antitrust laws. The political aspects of OPEC seem to have splintered the group and distracted it, at least intermittently, from a disciplined and unified oil strategy, perhaps to a greater extent than any alliance of private firms might have 37 experienced. Thus, with regard to the contribution that government sponsorship has made toward achieving cartel cohesion, OPEC and the IOCC are quite distinct.
Although the interstate oil cartel and OPEC differ in certain respects, together they illustrate how government involvement can make public cartels behave differently than private ones. Government cartels can sometimes better police output limits, quota compliance, and restrictions on entry, but they involve political trade-offs that lower monopoly rents through higher production costs or nonoptimal production patterns.
Because explicit monetary side payments are either illegal or politically difficult to negotiate, a consensus on regulatory policies involves other forms of compensation, such as preferential production quotas, even if they lead to lower collusive profits. In principle, at least, the parties within private cartels could negotiate monetary side payments to compensate those firms whose output was being differentially constrained in order to raise cartel profits. In this way, quotas and production patterns could be more optimally designed within private cartels. But history shows that private cartels suffer from cheating by members or from entry by nonmembers if prices are raised above competitive levels.
Hence, to be more successful, cartels require government intervention, but their policies will be molded by political conditions and may not closely follow those predicted by economic theory. 
